I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida v. Wells, 1 a unanimous Supreme Court held that if the police do not have a policy governing the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search, then the opening of such a container during the inventory search of an impounded automobile violates fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The decision requires scrutiny for two reasons. First, Wells is notable primarily for its dicta regarding police discretion in determining the scope of inventory searches, and, as such, changes the law very little. It is therefore questionable whether this decision adequately resolves the split in the circuits over how to apply precedent to inventory search cases. Second, the dicta of the opinion suggests that the next time the Court hears an inventory search case, it will change the law to conform to the dicta in Wells; in so doing, the Court will grant the police a measure of discretion to determine the scope of inventory searches. This Note anticipates this sequence of events, and therefore also evaluates the "new" law to determine its effects on the rights of the individual motorist.
This Note concludes that the Court did act to resolve a split in the circuit courts over the application of Colorado v. Bertine, 3 a landmark decision concerning inventory searches. Yet, there seems to be no answer for why the Court chose to address the split through the facts of Wells, which do not present the issue in controversy.
According to dicta in this decision, the Court seems prepared to move toward excluding less evidence by granting police a measure of discretion to open closed containers. This Note concludes, however, that such a law probably will not have that effect on the amount of evidence courts admit. This result would be true even if the Court accepts a standard allowing absolute police discretion to determine the scope of the search.
II. BACKGROUND

A. FACTS
Martin Leslie Wells drove his friend's BMW on State Highway 207, near Palatka, Florida, 4 on the night of February 11, 1985. 5 Florida State Trooper Rodney Adams observed the car travelling sixty-one miles per hour in a fifty miles per hour zone and pulled Wells over. 6 Nothing else about the movement of the car attracted notice. 7 According to Trooper Adams, Wells conducted himself as a total gentleman upon getting out of the car. 8 Adams noticed the smell of alcohol on Wells' breath 9 and administered roadside sobriety tests. 10 After conducting these tests, Trooper Adams informed Wells that he was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and would be transported to the station for a breathalizer test.1 a Wells commented that he was cold and that he wanted to go to the car to get his jacket. 12 To protect himself, Trooper Adams accompanied Wells to the BMW and visually surveyed the interior of car.' 8 The officer saw money, totalling three thousand dollars, scattered on the floorboard. 14 Upon inquiry, Wells made several contradictory statements about the origin and his knowledge of the cash. 15
Trooper Adams requested to view the contents of the trunk, and Wells consented. 16 However, neither Wells nor Adams suc-ceeded in opening the lock. 17 A wrecker towed the car to a local garage, where Trooper Adams finally succeeded in opening the trunk.' 8 Adams spoke with his corporal about whether to perform an inventory search, and the corporal responded that he [Adams] should do what he thought best.' 9 The garage attendant testified that Trooper Adams wanted to run a "real good" inventory search of the car, because he believed it contained drugs. 20 Trooper Adams proceeded to search the car thoroughly, looking in the glove compartment, the ashtrays, underneath the seats, and in the crack between the seats. 21 He found two roachclips in the ashtray but was unable to determine their age. 22 Adams then went back to the car's trunk and removed a suitcase which felt as though it contained something. 28 Using "a couple of knives," he pried the suitcase open. 24 The garage attendant further testified that Trooper Adams felt sure the suitcase contained drugs. 25 Adams assumed that opening the suitcase came under the authority of the inventory search; however, after discovering eighteen pounds of marijuana inside the suitcase, he questioned whether he should have obtained a warrant.
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B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 2, 1985, Wells filed an amended motion to suppress all evidence seized on February 12, 1985.27 The motion was denied. 28 The defendant thereafter entered a plea of nlo contendere to the charge of possession of a controlled substance, but specifically reserved the right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. The Florida Supreme Court found the application of law to the facts straightforward. The United States Supreme Court had held in Bertine that the admission into evidence of narcotics found in a backpack during a standard inventory search of an automobile did not violate constitutional protections. 4 1 In Bertine, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, emphasized in a footnote that police department procedures required the opening of closed containers and the listing of their contents. 4 the Court held that a routine, warrantless inventory search of an illegally parked car, which had been impounded by the police, did not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; accordingly, the marijuana found in the unlocked glove compartment constituted admissible evidence. 50 Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, noted that cars retain a lesser degree of fourth amendment protection than houses for two reasons: first, the mobile nature of the automobile; and second, the lessened expectation of privacy. 5 1 Since the car in question had been abandoned temporarily and was not in danger of disappearing, Chief Justice Burger primarily addressed the issue of reduced expectations of privacy. He articulated three reasons for the lessened privacy expectations. First, law enforcement officers during routine activity frequently have contact with automobiles. Second, automobiles are subject to extensive government regulation and inspection. Third, travel by automobile is public by nature. 52 He ultimately justified the warrantless search through this lessened expectation of privacy.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger noted precedent which declared unconstitutional administrative searches of buildings when no warrant had been obtained. 53 He also elaborated on the fact that since the automobile inventory search was non-criminal, the warrant requirement which presupposed probable cause did not apply. However, he noted these propositions in footnotes and did not address the seeming contradiction.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, wrote that the police must first specifically determine that a car is to be inventoried, and second must exhaust efforts to find the owner to get permission before an inventory search may take place. 55 In Illinois v. Lafayette, the Court held the inventory search of a also Wells, 539 So. 2d at 471 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw believed that since Trooper Adams followed his standard operating procedure, the search was constitutional under Bertine. Therefore, Justice Shaw and the other dissenters thought that the search had been sufficiently regulated. However, the Highway Patrol Manual was not in effect at the time of the search. This lack of a manual later assumed a significant role in Although this search did not involve a car, it is relevant to Wells for two reasons. First, instead of determining whether the object of the inventory search has a reduced expectation of privacy, the Court focused on whether probable cause was required, given the exigent circumstances. If probable cause was not required, then as a matter of law, the need to acquire a warrant is obviated. 58 Second, the Court stated that a possibility of less intrusive means did not render the search unreasonable. 59 Chief Justice Burger noted that the purpose of Supreme Court review was to pass on the constitutionality of a particular search rather than to give instructions on the best way to conduct routine administrative duties.60 This case shifted the focus of the Court away from the reduced expectation of privacy rationale to concerns over the police's need for efficiency in conducting inventory searches.
In Bertine, the Court held that during the routine inventory search of an impounded vehicle, the opening of a container found inside the vehicle did not violate the fourth amendment if it occurred in accordance with established procedures. 6 1 In Bertine, the police conducted an inventory search on a van which had been properly impounded after the arrest of the owner for driving while intoxicated. While listing all items in the van, the police opened a closed backpack to list its contents and found illegal drugs. 6 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Opperman and Lafayette principles governed the facts at hand, because Bertine also presented a reasonable police regulation concerning administrative searches applied in good faith. 6 3 He extended these principles to add that during a valid search, asking police to make subtle distinctions between compartments in the car must give way to completion of the task at hand. 6 4 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in response to the defendant's argument, ruled that the discretion to allow the officer to im- pound the car had not been precluded by precedent. 65 Justice Blackmun concurred, arguing that the police did not have discretion to determine the scope of the search. 6 6 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, continued to advocate balancing the government's interest against the individual's expectation of privacy. 67 Bertine suggests, however, that inventory searches of automobiles completed pursuant to standard criteria serve a government interest which outweighs an individual's privacy interest.
68
III.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court unanimously held unconstitutional Trooper Adams' search and affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's holding that the evidence obtained through the inventory search must be suppressed. 69 Thus, the conviction was thrown out. Although he affirmed the lower court ruling, 7 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by distinguishing the law applied by the Florida court from the law of Bertine. 73 He stated that the Florida court's reasoning missed the heart of both the opinion and the concurrence in Bertine. 74 Quoting Bertine, he wrote "nothing [in the controlling cases] prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." 75 The need for standard criteria, 7 6 he continued, came from 7 7
The Court then squarely disagreed with the Florida court's statement that inventory searches must be restricted to either opening all or none of the dosed containers discovered during the search. 78 After noting the policy reasons for conducting inventory searches, 79 Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that a police officer must be allowed sufficient latitude to make judgments which arise from the nature of these searches. 8 0 ChiefJustice Rehnquist further stated that if a state's policy allowed officers to open closed containers the contents of which were not apparent from the exterior, such a policy would not violate fourth amendment protections; instead, it would be rationally related to the purpose of an inventory search. 8 1 The Court then affirmed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment. Justice Brennan first noted that this search would be found unconstitutional under any reading of precedent. 8 2 He interpreted the law to require that inventory searches must be regulated to ensure no police discretion to meet constitutional standards. Trooper Adams made several discretionary judgments, including the decisions to impound the car, to perform an inventory search, and to open the suitcase. 8 6 Justice Brennan further questioned whether an inventory search took place at all, as neither an inventory sheet nor testimony that any objects were recorded elsewhere was admitted into evidence. 8 7 Rather, the testimony only established that the search served the purpose of looking for drugs.
8
The record is replete with evidence of Trooper Adams' determination to find drugs in the car. 8 9 Justice Brennan next assessed the majority opinion. He agreed with the majority's holding to the extent that it affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that total police discretion to open a locked container during an inventory search violated fourth amendment guarantees. 9 0 However, Justice Brennan disagreed with the suggestion that a state may adopt a policy granting the police some discretion. 9 1 Not only did the statement constitute pure dicta, but Justice Brennan argued it misrepresented the reasoning and the holding of Bertine.
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To support this argument, Justice Brennan reviewed the Florida Supreme Court's analysis of the Bertine decision. First, he reiterated that only an inventory search procedure which limits police discretion may be characterized as reasonable. 93 Next, he emphasized that footnote six of Bertine constituted part of the applicable law.
9 4 In response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that a state may grant police some discretion, he noted that the language in Bertine relied on by the ChiefJustice, specifically that "nothing in written guidelines actually existed until after the search. The State of Florida argued instead that the search was controlled by "standard operating procedures" which were later incorporated into the Highway Patrol Manual. 89 Id. at 1636-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). The garage attendant had testified, "[Trooper Adams] wanted to inventory the car real good because he felt sure there was drugs in it." "There ain't nobody runs around with that kind of money on the floorboard unless they're dealing drugs or something like that." "[Adams] had a strong suspicion there was drugs in the car and it was probably in the suitcase." On discovering the marijuana, Adams said "There it is." Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at 141- Opperman... prohibits police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria," responded to an argument that because the police had discretion whether to impound the car, the search was unconstitutional. 95 Justice Brennan concluded, therefore, that this portion of Bertine did not apply to the question at hand. Quoting Justice Blackmun's Bertine concurrence, Justice Brennan reasserted that opening suitcases during an inventory search conformed with the fourth amendment only if the police officer followed a policy that mandated opening such containers in every impounded car. 96 Finally, Justice Brennan reiterated his dissenting position in Bertine, which stated that because opening a closed container constitutes a great invasion of privacy, only consent and exigency ought to justify doing so. 9 7 He concluded that "[i]f the Court wishes to revisit [Bertine], it must wait for another case. Attempting to cast doubt on the vitality of the holding in Bertine in this otherwise easy case is not justified." 9 8
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun agreed that a police officer should not have complete discretion to open closed containers during an inventory search. 99 He refrained from joining the majority opinion, however, because rather than ruling on the facts at hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered an opinion on the extent to which an officer may be given discretion.' 00 Justice Blackmun agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that a state need not impose an all-or-nothing requirement on opening closed containers.' 0 ' For example, a state could require the opening of all containers over a certain size. question, but only in dicta. Specifically, the majority suggests that the police should be granted discretion to determine the scope of an administrative inventory search on a case-by-case basis. This solution would obviously create an unprecedented amount of police discretion. The facts of the various Supreme Court cases on this matter have been quite similar. For example, Opperman involved an illegally parked, apparently abandoned car.' 13 The police conducted an inventory search according to standard criteria and found marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. Although the Court upheld the search because of a reduced expectation of privacy, the search still conformed to established department procedures. Regardless, the marijuana was admitted into evidence. 1 4 Similarly, the police in Bertine conducted an inventory search of an impounded vehicle; since the search of the backpack conformed with established police procedures, it too was declared constitutional. 15 Wells concerned an impounded car which was searched, but no standard criteria existed to guide the search of the suitcase. Police found marijuana in the locked suitcase in the trunk; however, the evidence was not admitted because the search was declared unconstitutional. 16 The existence of standard criteria for the search appears to be the only tenable distinction between these cases, especially because Wells gave Trooper Adams permission to look in the trunk. Since no factual distinction other than the absence of standard criteria can be made between Opperman, Bertine, and Wells, Wells does not change the law substantially. Since Wells rules against the state and is the first of this line of cases to do so, Wells does limit Bertine, but the limitation is modest. Bertine established the proposition that regulated inventory searches which required police to open closed containers found in the automobile were constitutional." 8 Wells simply holds that the opening of a suitcase found in the automobile pursuant to a policy with no requirement concerning closed containers is not constitutional." 19 However, this explicit requirement of standard criteria is overshadowed by the dicta regarding discretion. The case merits atten- Even taking into account the Wells decision, the law concerning inventory searches has changed very little since 1976. The law has changed only to allow the opening of closed containers pursuant to standard criteria in Bertine.1 27 Justice Rehnquist's discussion of police discretion in Wells indicates that the next case concerning inventory searches may very well bring a new change in the law; namely, that a state may grant its police a degree of discretion in determining the scope of a non-criminal, administrative inventory search. For the first time, it is possible that such a search will be upheld as constitutional.
B. THE APPLICATION OF WELLS BY LOWER COURTS
The circuits and states have applied Bertine to inventory searches in differing manners. Two general interpretations emerge: some courts follow the Florida Supreme Court interpretation as ar- 120 Id. at 1635. 121 ticulated in its Wells decision, while other courts follow a more liberal interpretation of Bertine, which coincides with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Wells. The split does not center on whether an all-or-nothing rule must control the opening of containers during searches; rather, it focuses on the question of whether the police have a measure of discretion to open a container. Florida is among the jurisdictions which read Bertine to eliminate all police discretion. 128 Other jurisdictions, however, read Bertine to allow discretion in keeping with the goals of the inventory search, as does the dicta in Wells. 129 The Wells Court's attempt to address this issue through dicta may affect future Supreme Court cases, but it will not unify the circuits immediately.
Florida does not stand alone in its preclusion of police discretion. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Porter,' 3 0 reached a similar result. In Porter, police forced open a locked briefcase found in a car's trunk during an inventory search. The briefcase contained drugs. Testimony established that police had conducted the search pursuant to local and federal policies requiring that the car be inventoried thoroughly. 1 3 ' The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's admission of the drugs as evidence, in part because the officers had no discretion in conducting the search. A Utah court also read Bertine to preclude discretion. In State v. Shamblin, l3 3 the court held that opening a shaving kit during an inventory search violated the fourth amendment, because no procedures existed to regulate the opening of closed containers. 3 4 The only procedure in existence at the time of the search simply stated that "a written record shall be made of the contents of the vehi- 131 Id. Underlying these findings that standard criteria have or have not been adhered to, is a question which is rarely (and then inconsistently) answered. Must the standard criteria be in the form of a written, official document or will an informal policy suffice? Decisions cover the spectrum of possibilities. The Third Circuit in United States v. Frank, 864 F. 2d 992, 1004 (3d Cir. 1988), stated that no written policy was needed. The Eighth Circuit in Porter simply accepted the trial court's determination that procedure had been followed without inquiring into how the determination was made. Porter, 859 F.2d at 85. The United States Supreme Court in Wells noted that written policies were not in effect during the search and did not accept the state's argument that standard procedure governed the search. Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1636 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, the Wells decision did not hold that the policy must be in writing. This question seems to be another well-suited for certiorari. Presently, trial courts make this determination as an issue of fact without Supreme Court guidance. On the other hand, some jurisdictions interpret Bertine to comport generally with ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dicta in Wells concerning discretion. The Third Circuit in United States v. Frank 137 held that a formalized standard for the scope of the search was met automatically when the policy calls for an inventory, since an inventory means a listing of all items. 138 Bertine, the court held, only required explicit criteria to determine when an inventory must take place. 3 9 This reasoning validates all evidence found in a properly authorized inventory search, since everything must be listed by the officer. Every single item in the car is ipsofacto within the scope of a constitutionally permissible search.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Judge 1 4 0 held that a DEA agent used permissible discretion in determining that a bag was a "container;" therefore, the use of evidence found in the bag did not violate the fourth amendment.' 4 1 The court's analysis began by stating that drug enforcement agents have authorization to open containers and inventory the contents.' 4 2 The agent must, therefore, exercise discretion to determine what object is a container and whether to impound the object of the inventory. 14 3 The court then analyzed whether that discretion had been exercised in a way consistent with the inventory or with a view toward gaining evidence. To make this determination, the court applied an "objective standard" equivalent to determining whether an arrest had been the pretext to a search. 14 4 The court found that the agent had used appropriate discretion in opening a bag in Judge's car and that the $65,000 found therein was admissible.
Wells did not address the issue of how much discretion an officer may use; it only ruled that one officer acting with total discretion had too much. The dicta of the ruling, although it appears to en-dorse the Fifth Circuit approach, does little to unify the various jurisdictions. Wells most likely will have minimal effect on the lower courts' application of Bertine, because these courts simply may choose to ignore the dicta and apply older, lower court rulings which are on point. If the Court wanted to clarify the law concerning the extent to which an officer may or may not exercise discretion in such a search, then it should have selected a case which addressed the issue. For example, the Court could have granted certiorari to the Judge decision, which held that an officer may use discretion in an inventory search; resolution of the constitutionality of this procedure would have solved the conflict in the circuits.145
C. THE EFFECT OF PROBABLE FUTURE LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF
MOTORISTS
The Wells dicta suggests that when a state grants discretion to a police officer to determine the scope of the inventory search, the search will not violate the Constitution. While the Wells decision held that unregulated inventory searches in which an officer opened a closed container were unconstitutional as a matter of law, the majority's dicta seemed to espouse the Fifth Circuit's decision inJudge. Recall thatJudge held that if the facts surrounding the decision to open a container indicated that the decision was made to further the taking of the inventory rather than merely to obtain evidence of criminal activity, then the search does not violate the Constitution. 146 The Fifth Circuit thus adopted an objective test to regulate the officer's discretionary decisions. Specifically, "we must ask whether the agent's action, when viewed from an objective standpoint, can reasonably be said to have an administrative or safety motivation as opposed to an evidence seeking one."' 14 7 To answer this inquiry, the court reviews objective criteria such as the facts sur- Although more recent cases have used reasoning which undermined this precedent, the Court emphasized that the lower courts must follow those cases which control the facts before them and leave to the Supreme Court the decision to overrule. Since Wells did not actually address how much discretion police may exercise, this jurisprudence compels lower courts to ignore ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dicta and to apply direct precedent. rounding the search rather than to the subjective intent of the officer.
If the discretionary standard 48 becomes the law, the intrusiveness of inventory searches could be increased greatly, as the change to an objective standard may lead to unjustifiable searches. Yet, after evaluating theJudge and Bertine holdings, it appears that the discretionary standard will not be more intrusive. In fact, under Bertine, more containers would be opened than under the discretionary standard, in part because Bertine upheld police discretionary decisions to impound the car, thereby necessitating the inventory search.' 4 9 The discretionary standard, then, already constitutes the only barrier between the motorist and the police in jurisdictions which apply the Bertine rule.
By comparing Judge's objective standard (which is also the discretionary standard) to the two standards applied respectively in Bertine and Wells, the objective standard appears less invasive than the Bertine standard. This comparison can be made by examining a single set of facts-the facts of Wells-and applying the three standards to it. Recall that in Wells, a state trooper stopped Wells for speeding, noticed the smell of alcohol on his breath, administered roadside sobriety tests, and then arrested Wells for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon peering into the car, the trooper noticed a large amount of cash. The officer had the car towed to a local garage where he ran an inventory search. Upon finding roachclips in the ashtray, he intensified his efforts, now convinced he would find illegal drugs. The officer made several statements confirming this intent. He found a locked suitcase in the trunk, surmised it contained drugs, and forced it open. only when a policy directly mandates it; since Florida did not have a policy concerning closed containers, the court suppressed the evidence acquired as a result of opening the closed container. Only two facts are important under the Wells standard to the determination of the constitutionality of the search. First, no policy exists for the opening of dosed containers discovered during the inventory search. Second, the container was opened. Under the second standard, the Judge discretionary standard, the confiscated drugs would be admissible if the officer's actions objectively served the purpose of creating an inventory rather than finding evidence. The defendant had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The officer observed money on the floorboard. These facts demanded an inventory search since the property must be accounted for during the defendant's detention. Valuable property also may have been inside the suitcase, so it needed to be accounted for in the inventory. An officer could have concluded that it contained more money. The officer's subjective intent upon finding the suitcase is irrelevant, however. Under the objective standard for pretext searches, the expectation of finding evidence does not invalidate an otherwise lawful search.' 51 Hence, under the objective standard of discretion, the evidence may be admissible.
Finally, under the Bertine standard, police may open dosed containers only if a policy directly mandates doing so in every case. Assume that the state has enacted a policy requiring every container to be opened and its contents listed. In this scenario, the police would be required to open every closed container in the car. Thus, the illegal drugs would constitute admissible evidence.
These examples demonstrate that the Bertine standard allows greater intrusion by the state than does the discretionary standard, because Bertine allows officers to open small, innocuous items like shaving kits, change purses, and duffel bags with impunity. Opening a shaving kit or a first aid kit under the objective standard would be difficult to explain. The Bertine standard would also allow more evidence to be admitted, since everything found in the car or in a container would be admissible. The objective standard, however, limits the scope of the search; officers cannot open containers which serve no administrative or safety purpose. Evidence taken from these containers would be suppressed.
The debate over whether discretion to impound the automobile as upheld in Bertine also extends to the scope of inventory searches overlooks an important point. Justice Brennan and those who agree with him argue that allowing the police this discretion is dangerous, since they may abuse it and subject citizens to pretext searches for evidence of criminal activity; accordingly, "no discretion" regarding the scope of the search is needed to protect fully individual rights. Yet, according to Bertine, police may decide whether to impound the car (and therefore whether to run an inventory search) as long as the decision is made for administrative rather than evidence relatedreasons. 15 2 The test developed in Bertine to regulate police decisions is exactly the same test advocated by the discretionary standard to regulate the scope of the inventory search. 15 3 Any argument about the danger of abuse loses its force when one considers that police have been exercising discretion over whether to impound the car (and necessitate an inventory search) since at least 1987.
Further, discretion to impound may be more important than the discretion to determine the scope of the search. After all, an inventory search cannot be conducted unless the car is impounded. For example, if a trooper desires to search a car because he believes it contains illegal drugs, he or she may create a pretext to impound the car in order to search it. If the officer can hide illicit motives behind that discretion, then limiting the scope of the search would offer sparse protection. This is especially true in a jurisdiction like Colorado where officers are instructed to open every container.
In short, because Bertine already has granted states authority to require the opening of every container during an inventory search and to allow officers discretion to impound (and therefore to inventory) the car, a ruling which allows states to grant discretion to officers to determine the scope of the search would not erode civil liberties.' strike the proper balance between state and individual interests? To both questions this Note gives a qualified "yes." Even a cursory reading of cases in the various jurisdictions shows division on the interpretation of Bertine. The more perplexing aspect of this question is why the Court chose to address the division through Wells rather than another case. The facts in Wells did not present the Court with an opportunity to address the question of whether a government agent may exercise discretion during an inventory search. Nonetheless, ChiefJustice Rehnquist chose to address the question in dicta. Unfortunately, the use of dicta is not an effective solution to the existing problem.
Regarding the second issue, the granting of discretion to officers during an inventory search does not tip the scales too far in favor of the state. First, the police already have discretion whether to impound the car and, therefore, whether to run an inventory. There does not appear to be any reason why the police, who currently exercise discretion fairly, would exercise it unfairly when the discretion is extended to include the scope of the search. Second, inventory searches are exhaustive by their nature. 15 5 Allowing police discretion to open suitcases will extend state intrusion a small degree in jurisdictions like Florida, where no containers presently may be opened, but not at all in jurisdictions like Colorado, where all containers discovered during a search are presently opened.
Florida v. Wells is notable because it portends the new shape of fourth amendment law, but it does not threaten the rights of the individual motorist.
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